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Time-inconsistency refers to a paradox in decision making where agents exhibit inconsistent behaviors over
time. Examples are procrastination where agents tends to postpone easy tasks, and abandonments where
agents start a plan and quit in the middle. These behaviors are undesirable in that agents make clearly
suboptimal decisions over optimal ones. To capture such behaviors and more importantly, to quantify inef-
ficiency caused by such behaviors, [?] propose a graph model which is essentially the same as the standard
planning model except for the cost structure. Using this model, they initiate the study of several interesting
computation problems: 1) cost ratio: the worst ratio between the actual cost of the agent and the optimal
cost, over all the graph instances; 2) motivating subgraph: how to motivate the agent to reach the goal by
deleting nodes and edges; 3) Intermediate rewards: how to motivate agents to reach the goal by placing
intermediate rewards. Kleinberg and Oren give partial answers to these questions, but the main problems
are still open. In fact, they raise these problems as open problems in their original paper.
In this paper, we give answers to all three open problems in [?]. First, we show a tight upper bound
of cost ratio for graphs without Akerlof ’s structure, thus confirm the conjecture by Kleinberg and Oren
that Akerlof ’s structure is indeed the worst case for cost ratio. Second, we prove that finding a motivating
subgraph is NP-hard, showing that it is generally inefficient to motivate agents by deleting nodes and edges
in the graph. Last but not least, we show that computing a strategy to place minimum amount of total
reward is also NP-hard.
Categories and Subject Descriptors: J.4 [Social and Behavioral Sciences]: Economics
Additional Key Words and Phrases: behavioral economics, time-inconsistency, computational complexity
1. INTRODUCTION
In behavioral economics, an important theme has been to understand individual be-
haviors that are inconsistent over time. There are at least two types of inconsistencies
investigated in the literature. The first type is Procrastination [???]: agents tend to
postpone costly actions even though such delay may incur further cost. The second
type is abandonment [?]: agents plan for a multi-phase task (usually with rewards in
the end), spend efforts in the initial phases and decide to quit in the middle.
Both types of behaviors have been widely observed in reality. Akerlof [?] describes a
story of procrastination (restated in [?]) where an agent must ship a package within the
next a few days, incurs an immediate cost for shipping the package or some additional
daily cost for not shipping the package. Clearly, the optimal strategy for the agent is
to ship the package right away, avoiding any additional daily cost. However, as the
story goes, the agent chooses to procrastinate and to send the package in one of the
last few days. Similar examples abound, ranging from golf club members that never
play golf (abandonment) to investors that rent an apartment for years before making
a purchase (procrastination).
The interpretation to all these phenomena lies in that agents value current cost
more than the cost in the future. Researchers in the literature have developed various
models to capture this observation and to interpret the inconsistencies [????]. We refer
the readers to [?] and the references therein for a detailed description of this line
of work. In what follows, we describe the model in [?], coined the time-inconsistent
planning model, based on which all the analyses of this paper are built.
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1.1. The time-inconsistent planning model
Roughly put, the time-inconsistent planning model is no different from the standard
planning model [??], except for a slight twist on the cost structure. The standard plan-
ning model is a directed graph (aka. task graph) where each node in the graph repre-
sents a state, each directed edge denotes an action that transits one state to another
and each action incurs a certain cost, marked as the weight on the edge. The plan-
ner’s goal is to find a shortest (min-cost) path between the initial state and goal state.
The time-inconsistent planning model modifies the model above by redefining the cost
of a path: instead of summing the costs of all edges on that path:
∑
i=1 c(ei) where
c(ei) is the cost of the i-th edge on the path, a time-inconsistent agent applies a mul-
tiplicative factor 0 < β < 1 to the costs of all the edges except for the first edge in
the path c(e1) + β
∑
i=2 c(ei). The interpretation is that the time-inconsistent agent
evaluates actions at the current state at its true cost, while discounts the costs (re-
wards) of all future actions by β. The time-inconsistent planning model is defined as
a time-inconsistent agent who looks for a discounted shortest path at any state in
the task graph. The cost model above can also be considered as a special case of the
quasi-hyperbolic discounting model [?].
Simple as it appears to be, the model is powerful enough to capture a range of inter-
esting time-inconsistent behaviors. In particular, Kleinberg and Oren [?] show that:
— It can easily capture Akerlof ’s example of procrastination by Figure 1.
— Time-inconsistency agents sometimes follows a sub-optimal path (see also Figure 1).
— The model can be easily extended to a model to include reward, simply by placing
some reward at the goal node. This extension can be further used to capture the
phenomenon of abandonment: an agent may find it desirable to follow the optimal
discounted path at initial nodes but then find it not beneficial when evaluating at
some middle node.
— The model can be used to model the interesting fact of choice reduction: agents can be
better motivated to reach the goal by deleting certain middle nodes and edges from
the task graph.
1.2. Results, open problems by [?] and our contributions
Perhaps more importantly (from the perspective of EC), the time-inconsistent model
facilitates analyses of the following important computation problems:
(1) Cost ratio. Cost ratio is defined as the ratio between the cost of the path found by
the agent and that of the min-cost path. [?] gives a characterization of cost ratio
in terms of graph minors1: roughly, any graph with a sufficiently high (at least λn
for some λ > 1 and n) cost ratio must contain Figure 1 (denoted as Fk) as a graph
minor and k is at least a constant fraction of n. In light of this characterization,
an important open problem raised by Kleinberg and Oren is: when the graph does
not contain a Fk-minor, how bad can the cost ratio be? This question is particularly
important since it concerns whether Fk is indeed the worst case instance for cost
ratio.
We solve this problem by proving that, for any graph that does not contain a Fk-
minor, the cost ratio can be at most β2−k, where β is the discount factor. Therefore,
we confirm that Fk is indeed the worst case instance for cost ratio and the bound
proved by Kleinberg and Oren is tight.
(2) Minimal Motivating Subgraphs. A motivating subgraph is a subgraph of the origi-
nal task graph and a time-inconsistent agent can reach the goal in this subgraph.
1To be formally defined immediately
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A motivating subgraph is minimal if none of its proper subgraphs is motivating.
Clearly, motivating subgraph is closely related to the previously mentioned eco-
nomic problem of choice reduction. Kleinberg and Oren prove a relatively com-
plex property that says the minimal motivating subgraphs are necessarily sparse.
Here, we ask a natural complexity question: what is the computational complexity
of finding motivating subgraph? This is also the second open problem raised by
Kleinberg and Oren. We prove that this problem is NP-hard. More generally, we
show that finding any motivating subgraph (e.g., maximal) is NP-hard.
(3) Cost of placing intermediate rewards. Instead of motivating agents to reach their
goal by choice reduction (i.e., via motivating subgraph), an alternative way that
has been seen in the literature is to place rewards on intermediate nodes. A natural
question (the third open problem by Kleinberg and Oren) is: what is the minimum
total reward needed to motivate an agent to reach its goal? We prove that this
problem is also NP-hard.
In short, we give answers to all three open questions in [?].
2. FORMAL DESCRIPTION OF THE MODEL
As defined in [?], the task graph is an acyclic directed graph G with a start node s and
a target (goal) node t, where each edge (u, v) has a non-negative cost c(u, v). For any
pair of nodes (u, v), we denote by d(u, v) the minimum total cost from u to v,
d(u, v) = min
P∈P(u,v)
∑
e∈P
c(e),
where P(u, v) is the set of all possible paths from u to v. For simplicity, let d(v) = d(v, t)
for any node v. Denote the discount parameter by β ∈ [0, 1]. An agent starts at s and
travels towards t. In each step, the agent at node u chooses an out-neighbor v that
minimizes c(u, v)+βd(v) (if more than one node minimizes this value, the agent chooses
one arbitrarily). Clearly, the agent cares less about the future for smaller β. Suppose
P is the s-t path the agent chooses, the cost ratio is defined as
∑
e∈P c(e)/d(s), i.e., the
ratio of actual cost to the optimal cost.
To state the first open problem by Kleinberg and Oren, as well as our answer, we
need the following definitions, also from [?].
Given two undirected graphs H and K, we say that H contains a K-minor if we can
map each node κ of K to a connected subgraph Sκ in H, with the properties that (i) Sκ
and Sκ′ are disjoint for every two nodes κ, κ′ of K, and (ii) if (κ, κ′) is an edge of K,
then in H there is some edge connecting a node in Sκ with a node in Sκ′ .
Moreover, let σ(G) denote the skeleton of G, the undirected graph obtained by remov-
ing the directions on the edges of G. Let Fk denote the graph with nodes v1, v2, . . . , vk,
and w, and edges (vi, vi+1) for i = 1, . . . , k−1, and (vi, w) for i = 1, . . . , k. Figure 1 depicts
Fk. Fk is a special structure in this setting. For one, it vividly illustrates the Akerlof
story. Furthermore, [?] has proved the following theorem:
THEOREM 2.1. [?] For every λ > 1 there exist n0 > 0 and ε > 0 such that if n ≥ n0
and cost ratio r > λn, then σ(G) contains an Fk-minor for some k ≥ εn.
3. MAXIMUM COST RATIO
In light of the result above, Kleinberg and Oren propose the following open question:
what is the maximum cost ratio (if exists) if σ(G) does not contain an Fk-minor. In
other words, the problem asks, without Fk, how much waste can be resulted from
time-inconsistency. The question is extremely important since it is closely related to
whether Fk is the worst case instance for cost ratio.
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Note that an edge is exactly F1. Assume k > 1, we have the following theorem,
THEOREM 3.1. For any k > 1, if σ(G) does not contain an Fk-minor, the cost ratio is
at most β2−k. This bound is tight and can be achieved by Fk−1.
3.1. Proof Sketch
To analyze the cost ratio of any graph, our first observation is to focus on the set of
shortcut nodes. Roughly, a shortcut node is one where the agent’s min-cost choice is
different from his actual choice. Clearly, if there were no such nodes, i.e., the agent’s
actual path and min-cost path coincide, we would end up in the ideal case where the
cost ratio is 1. For each shortcut node, we obtain an inequality that states the dis-
counted cost of the actual path is less than or equal to that of the min-cost path. The
intuition here is that each appearance of such a shortcut node contribute a factor of β
to the cost ratio, and k appearances (to be rigourously defined in the main proof) would
lead to the worst case of βk and this only happens if Fk-minor exists.
To formally prove this statement, we need to carefully expand the cost formula d(s)
as a linear combination of costs on edges c(e)’s. This is complicated, again, by the
existence of shortcut nodes, since the recursive formula that defines d(ui) (where ui is
some shortcut node) introduces two new terms d(u′i), the cost from the next node on
the actual path and d(wi), the cost where the current min-cost path merges with the
actual path (See Figure 2). Our strategy is to fix d(wi) and carefully expand d(u′i).
A key step of our proof is that three different cases of wi are considered and different
relaxations are given for each case (see the definition of ti below). This is also why
Kleinberg-Oren paper fails to get the tight bound.
Continue the expansion of d(ui) using the rules above until the right hand side con-
tains c(e)’s only, i.e., representing d(ui) as a linear combination of c(e)’s. We obtain the
final bound by bounding the coefficients of the linear combination.
3.2. Formal Proof
Now we give a formal proof to Theorem 3.1. The proofs of all the lemmas will be shown
in appendix.
PROOF. Let P be the path that the agent actually travels through. The main idea
of the proof is to obtain an inequality with the form d(s) ≥ ∑e∈P α(e)c(e) where
α’s are positive coefficients, so that we can use the minimal coefficient to bound
d(s)/
∑
e∈P c(e).
Firstly we introduce some notations. For any node u on P , denote by u′ the node
immediately after u in P ; for any pair of nodes (u, v) in P , denote by c(u, v) the total
cost of edges between u and v ion P . A node u in P is defined to be a shortcut node if
the second node on the min-cost path from u to t is not u′ (note that the first node is
u). In other words, a shortcut node is one where the agent’s min-cost choice is different
from his actual choice on P .
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If u on P is not a shortcut node, we have d(u) = c(u, u′) + d(u′), then for the ideal
case when there is no shortcut node, we would have d(s) = c(s, s′) + d(s′) = c(s, s′) +
c(s′, s′′) + d(s′′) = · · · =∑e∈P c(e), resulting in a cost ratio of 1.
Now, suppose there are n shortcut nodes: u1, u2, . . . , un by the order of appearance
on P . For i = 1, 2, . . . , n, denote by Pi the min-cost path from ui to t; denote by wi the
second crossing point (note that the first node is ui) of P and Pi (if there are more than
one min-cost path, arbitrarily choose one); denote by vi the first node after ui on Pi.
Figure 2 describes the notations above.
By the definition of time-inconsistency, the agent at ui chooses P over Pi, we have
d(ui, wi) + βd(wi) ≥ c(ui, vi) + βd(vi, wi) + βd(wi) ≥ c(ui, u′i) + βd(u′i).
Add (1− β)d(wi) to both sides of the inequality and use d(u′i) = c(u′i, ui+1) + d(ui+1),
we have
d(ui) ≥ c(ui, u′i) + βd(u′i) + (1− β)d(wi)
= c(ui, u
′
i) + βc(u
′
i, ui+1) + βd(ui+1) + (1− β)d(wi). (1)
Formula (1) is an important inequality for us to obtain our final inequality. We will
expand the righthand side of (1) iteratively. For concreteness, we list below the first
few steps of the expansion:
d(s) = c(s, u1) + d(u1)
≥ c(s, u1) + c(u1, u′1) + βd(u′1) + (1− β)d(w1)
= c(s, u1) + c(u1, u
′
1) + βc(u
′
1, u2) + βd(u2) + (1− β)d(w1)
≥ c(s, u1) + c(u1, u′1) + βc(u′1, u2) + βc(u2, u′2) + β2d(u′2)
+ β(1− β)d(w2) + (1− β)d(w1)
≥ · · · .
We now claim that
d(s) ≥
i∑
j=1
(
ajc(u
′
j−1, uj) + bjc(uj , u
′
j)
)
+ ai+1d(u
′
i) +
∑
j∈Si+1
(1− β)bjd (wj) , (2)
where {ai, i = 1, 2, . . .}, {bi, i = 1, 2, . . .} are coefficients to be determined, and Si is the
set of i’s such that wi lies after u′i−1 (if u′i−1 = ui, then u′i−1 is included). Here u′0 = s
and un+1 = t. We will prove this claim by induction. Before that, for convenience, for
i = 1, 2, . . . , n, define ti as follows: if there exists j such that wi = uj , then ti = j;
otherwise if there exists j such that wi = u′j , then ti = j + 0.5; otherwise ti is the
smallest index such that uti lies after wi in P (if no such index, ti = n + 1). Since wi
must lie after u′i in P , we can obtain a trivial property that ti ≥ i + 1. Now Si can be
represented by {j|1 ≤ j < i, tj ≥ i}.
For i = 1, this claim holds trivially.
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For inductive cases: if (2) holds for i− 1, then
d(s) ≥
i−1∑
j=1
(
ajc(u
′
j−1, uj) + bjc(uj , u
′
j)
)
+ aid(u
′
i−1) +
∑
j∈Si
(1− β)bjd (wj)
=
i−1∑
j=1
(
ajc(u
′
j−1, uj) + bjc(uj , u
′
j)
)
+ ai
(
c(u′i−1, ui) + d(ui)
)
+
∑
j:tj=i
(1− β)bjd (wj)
+
∑
j:i<tj<i+1
(1− β)bjd (wj) +
∑
j∈Si:tj≥i+1
(1− β)bjd (wj)
≥
i−1∑
j=1
(
ajc(u
′
j−1, uj) + bjc(uj , u
′
j)
)
+ aic(u
′
i−1, ui) +
ai + ∑
j:tj=i
(1− β)bj
 d(ui)
+
∑
j:i<tj<i+1
(1− β)bjd (u′i) +
∑
j∈Si:tj≥i+1
(1− β)bjd (wj) (3)
≥
i−1∑
j=1
(
ajc(u
′
j−1, uj) + bjc(uj , u
′
j)
)
+ aic(u
′
i−1, ui)
+
ai + ∑
j:tj=i
(1− β)bj
 (c(ui, u′i) + βd(u′i) + (1− β)d(wi))
+
∑
j:i<tj<i+1
(1− β)bjd (u′i) +
∑
j∈Si:tj≥i+1
(1− β)bjd (wj)
≥
i−1∑
j=1
(
ajc(u
′
j−1, uj) + bjc(uj , u
′
j)
)
+ aic(u
′
i−1, ui) +
ai + ∑
j:tj=i
(1− β)bj
 c(ui, u′i)
+
β
ai + ∑
j:tj=i
(1− β)bj
+ ∑
j:i<tj<i+1
(1− β)bj
 d(u′i)
+ (1− β)
ai + ∑
j:tj=i
(1− β)bj
 d (wi) + ∑
j∈Si:tj≥i+1
(1− β)bjd (wj) . (4)
In (3) we use the property that if tj = i, i.e. wj lies between u′i−1 and ui (both are
included, since wj = u′i−1 in the case that u′i−1 = ui) on P , then d(wj) = c(wj , ui) +
d(ui) ≥ d(ui). Now if we set
ai = βbi−1 +
∑
j:i−1<tj<i
(1− β)bj , bi = ai +
∑
j:tj=i
(1− β)bj , (5)
Formula (4) is almost the same as (2) except for the last term. In fact, the following
lemma shows (4) and (2) are exactly the same.
LEMMA 3.2. For any sequence {xi, i = 1, 2, . . . , } and for m = 2, 3, . . . , n, we have∑
j∈Sm
xj = xm−1 +
∑
j∈Sm−1:tj≥m
xj .
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By this lemma, we see that (4) and (2) are of the same form, thus we have proved
claim (2) by induction. Furthermore, ai and bi are determined by (5) with a1 = 1.
Now set i = n in claim (2), we have
d(s) ≥
n∑
j=1
(
ajc
(
u′j−1, uj
)
+ bjc
(
uj , u
′
j
))
+ an+1c(u
′
n, t). (6)
Then all we need to do is to find lower bounds for ai and bi respectively. The bounds
can be obtained by the following lemma.
LEMMA 3.3. bi ≥ ai ≥ β|Si|.
Finally we show |Si| ≤ k − 2 for i = 1, 2, . . . , n + 1. For contradiction, let us assume
|Si| ≥ k − 1 for some i. Choose k − 1 elements from Si, say j1, j2, . . . , jk−1 where j1 <
j2 < · · · < jk−1 < i. For l = 1, 2, . . . , k − 1, since tjl ≥ i, we have wjl must lie after ui−1,
or ujk−1 on P , and also wjl 6= u′jk−1 (otherwise tjl = jk−1 + 0.5 < i), wjl must lie after
u′jk−1 on P . Now consider uj1 , uj2 , . . . , ujk−1 , u
′
jk−1 . Observe that the nodes lie on path P
in order. For l = 1, 2, . . . , k − 1, Pjl starts at ujl , and the next crossing point of Pjl and
P lies after u′jk−1 in P .
The following lemma states that if a graph has such a structure, it must contain an
Fk-minor.
LEMMA 3.4. Let P be a path of G, and u1, u2, . . . , uk are nodes on P in order of
appearance. If for i = 1, 2, . . . , k − 1, there exists a path Pi such that (i) it starts at ui,
and (ii) the second crossing point in Pi with P (say u′i) exists and lies after uk on P , then
σ(G) contains an Fk-minor.
By this lemma we conclude that σ(G) contains an Fk-minor, a contradiction. Thus
|Si| ≤ k − 2.
Hence by (6) and Lemma 3.3 we have
d(s) ≥
n∑
j=1
(
β|Sj |c
(
u′j−1, uj
)
+ β|Sj |c
(
uj , u
′
j
))
+ β|Sn+1|c (u′n, t) ≥ βk−2c(s, t),
which implies c(s, t)/d(s) ≤ β2−k.
3.3. Tightness of the Bound
So far we have obtained an upper bound for r, now we provide an example to show
that the bound is achievable. We simply use the example mentioned in [?] to show
a graph with exponential cost ratio, i.e. the graph obtained from Fk−1 by adding the
corresponding weights (see Figure 3).
By the analysis in [?], the cost ratio of the graph is exactly β2−k, which proves the
tightness of our upper bound.
4. HARDNESS OF FINDING MINIMAL MOTIVATING SUBGRAPHS
As mentioned, the basic model introduced in Section 2 can be easily extended to cap-
ture abandonment, by placing a reward at the target node. Formally, if the reward is r
and the agent is in node u, if minv c(u, v) + βd(v) > βr, i.e., the discounted cost is less
than the discounted reward, the agent abandons the plan.
A natural question in this extended model is whether a time-inconsistent agent can
reach the target, and if not, can we delete some nodes and edges to help it reach the
goal. The first question is easy to check. To formally investigate the second question,
define motivating subgraph as a subgraph of the original task graph such that the
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agent can reach the target in the subgraph. A motivating subgraph is minimal if none
of its proper subgraph is motivating. We are interested in the following computational
question concerning (minimal) motivating subgraph (also the second the open question
listed in [?]): is there a polynomial time algorithm that finds a (minimal) motivating
subgraph?
In what follows, we answer this question negatively (unless NP=P) with the follow-
ing theorem.
Definition 4.1. Problem MS: for an acyclic graph G with n nodes, given reward r
on target node and bias factor β, find a motivating subgraph of G.
THEOREM 4.2. Problem MS is NP-hard.
Before proving Theorem 4.2, consider an easier complexity problem related to mini-
mal motivating subgraphs.
4.1. Hardness of finding minimal motivating subgraph
In this section, we show that finding a minimal motivating subgraph is hard.
Definition 4.3. Problem MMS: for an acyclic graph G with n nodes, given reward r
on target node and present bias β, find a minimal motivating subgraph of G.
We have the following theorem.
THEOREM 4.4. Problem MMS is NP-hard.
PROOF. We show that finding a valid assignment to a 3-CNF can be polynomial-
time reduced to an instance of MMS. Consider a 3-CNF with n variables x1, x2, ..., xn
and m clauses C1, C2, ..., Cm. For fixed β, let f = 1− 12β− 12β2, z = 2+ 32β+ 1+β1−β , ` = d zf e.
Construct a weighted acyclic graph G as follows:
(1) Each clause Ci corresponds to one node ui, 1 ≤ i ≤ m;
(2) Each variable xi corresponds to two nodes vi and v′i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n;
(3) The other nodes are start node s, target node t and interior points w1, w2, · · · , w`
and w;
(4) For any clause Ci = yi,1 ∨ yi,2 ∨ yi,3: for j = 1, 2, 3, if yi,j is xk, then there is an edge
(ui, vj) with weight 2 and we call such an edge an “expensive edge”; if yi,j is ¬xk,
then there is an edge (ui, vj) with weight 1 + β and we call such an edge a “cheap
edge”.
(5) For any 1 ≤ i ≤ n: there is an edge (vi, v′i) with weight 1 − β and an edge (v′i, w)
with weight 0. The two edges form an “expensive path” from vi to w. Also, there is
an edge (vi, w) with weight 0, and we call such an edge a “cheap path” from vi to w.
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(6) (s, u1), (um, w1) are edges with weight f . For each 1 ≤ i ≤ m− 1, (ui, ui+1) forms an
edge with weight f . For each 1 ≤ j ≤ `− 1, (wi, wi+1) forms an edge with weight f .
Edge (w`, t) has weight f + z − f`. These edges form a path from s to t, and we call
the path the “bus” of the graph. Finally there is an edge (w, t) with weight 32β+
1+β
1−β .
To visualize the construction, Figure 4 is a graph constructed from 3-CNF (x1∨¬x2∨
x3)∧ (x2∨¬x3∨x4) by following the rules above, and in this example β is set to be 0.9.
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Fig. 4. Corresponding graph of (x1 ∨ ¬x2 ∨ x3) ∧ (x2 ∨ ¬x3 ∨ x4) with β = 0.9.
To form an instance of MMS, define the reward at t to be r = 1+ 12β+β
−1+ 21−β . It can
be easily seen that such an instance can be constructed from the 3-CNF in polynomial
time. Now we have the following lemmas about the structure of minimal motivating
subgraph of G.
LEMMA 4.5. Let G′ be a minimal motivating subgraph of G, then the bus of G is
contained in G′. The only possible route that the agent travels through must be the bus.
PROOF. Assume by contradiction that some nodes on the bus are not included in
G′. Consider the path from s to t traveled by the agent in G′, we may easily observe
that w is on the path. When the agent arrives at w, the evaluated cost to the target
will be 32β +
1+β
1−β > β +
1
2β
2 + 1+β1−β = βr, thus the agent will not continue, which is a
contradiction to the fact that the graph is motivating. Thus the bus of G is contained
in G′. The reasoning also shows that the agent should never deviate from the bus.
LEMMA 4.6. LetG′ be a minimal motivating subgraph ofG. InG′ for any 1 ≤ j ≤ n,
if vj ∈ G′, then in G′ there exists exactly one path from vj to w.
PROOF. If vj starts no path to w, then vj cannot reach t in G′. We can observe
that after deleting vj the graph is still motivating, thus G′ is not minimal, which is a
contradiction. If both paths from vj to w remains inG′, we eliminate the expensive path
from vj to w while keeping the graph’s property of motivating, which also contradicts
the minimality of G′. Thus in G′ vj starts a unique path to w.
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LEMMA 4.7. LetG′ be a minimal motivating subgraph ofG. InG′ for any 1 ≤ i ≤ m,
ui connects to exactly one node vj not on the bus, while path ui → vj and vj → w cannot
be both expensive or both cheap.
PROOF. We apply induction on i. Firstly we consider the base case where i = m.
Theorem 5.1 in [?] stated that every node in a minimal motivating subgraph has no
more than two outgoing edges. Since ui has one out-degree in the bus from Lemma 4.5,
there exists at most one path from ui to w. If ui connects no edge to nodes outside the
bus, at ui−1 the agent will evaluate the cost to t as f+β(f+z) > βr, thus the agent will
stop at ui−1, contradictory with G′ is motivating. Now we assume ui connects to node
vj , from Lemma 4.6 vj starts exactly one path to w. If ui → vj and vj → w are both
expensive, then the cost from ui to w will be 3− β. At ui−1 the agent will evaluate the
cost to t as f + β(3− β + 32β + 1+β1−β ) > βr, thus the agent will stop at ui−1, which forms
a contradiction. If both paths are cheap, the agent will consider traveling through the
bus (with evaluated cost f + βz) more expensive than going out of the bus (with cost
1 + β + β( 32β +
1+β
1−β )), which means that the agent cannot reach the goal following
Lemma 4.5. Thus the statement is true when i = m.
Assume that the lemma is true for i = k, consider the case where i = k − 1. If ui
connects no edge to nodes outside the bus, at ui−1 the agent will evaluate the cost of
continuing as at least f + β(f + 2+ 32β +
1+β
1−β ) > βr by induction. Thus the agent stops
at ui−1, contradictory with G′ is motivating. Now we assume (ui, vj) ∈ G′, from Lemma
4.6 vj starts a unique path to w. The same as the above case ui → vj and vj → w cannot
be both expensive. If both paths are cheap, at ui−1 the agent will consider traveling
through the bus (with evaluated cost f + β(2 + 32β +
1+β
1−β )) more expensive than going
out of the bus (with cost 1+β+β( 32β+
1+β
1−β )), which means that the agent deviate from
the bus and will not reach the goal following Lemma 4.5. Therefore the statement is
true for i = k − 1, thus the lemma is true for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
Now we show how a valid assignment to a 3-CNF can be transformed to a corre-
sponding minimal motivating subgraph of G.
LEMMA 4.8. If a 3-CNF is satisfiable, then graph G constructed from the formula
contains a minimal motivating subgraph.
PROOF. Construct a subgraph G′ of the original graph G as follows. For each 1 ≤
i ≤ n, if xi is assigned true, remove v′i and adjacent edges; otherwise remove edge
(vi, w). For 1 ≤ i ≤ m, let Ci = yi1 ∨ yi2 ∨ yi3 , here yij denotes xij or ¬xij . Assume
WLOG. that yij is assigned true, then preserve only (ui, vij ) among (ui, vi1), (ui, vi2)
and (ui, vi3), eliminate the other two edges from G. We can verify that the remaining
graph is motivating as the time-inconsistent agent will always follow the bus.
Finally, we remove all nodes with no in-degree. The minimality of the graph follows
from Lemma 4.5 and 4.7.
To see how Lemma 4.8 works, again consider formula (x1∨¬x2∨x3)∧ (x2∨¬x3∨x4)
as an example. A valid assignment is x1 = ¬x2 = ¬x3 = x4 = 1, and the corresponding
minimal motivating subgraph is shown in Figure 5. The same as before we set β = 0.9.
Finally, we show how a minimal motivating subgraph of G can be transformed to a
valid assignment to the 3-CNF.
LEMMA 4.9. Let G′ be a minimal motivating subgraph of G. For any 1 ≤ j ≤ n, if
the expensive path from vj to w remains, assign xj = 0, otherwise assign xj = 1, then
the assignment is a valid assignment to the original 3-CNF.
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Fig. 5. Corresponding minimal motivating subgraph of (x1 ∨ ¬x2 ∨ x3) ∧ (x2 ∨ ¬x3 ∨ x4).
PROOF. From Lemma 4.7 we know that for any 1 ≤ i ≤ m, ui connects to exactly one
node vj outside the bus. If the path from vj to w is cheap, (ui, vj) must be expensive,
implying that xj is in clause Ci, thus the assignment xj = 1 can satisfy Ci. Otherwise,
(ui, vj) must be cheap, implying that ¬xj is in clause Ci, therefore Ci is satisfied by
the assignment letting xj = 0. Thus all clauses are satisfied by the assignment, which
means the assignment is a valid assignment to the original 3-CNF.
From Lemma 4.8 and Lemma 4.9, we know that if we can find a minimal motivating
subgraph for any graph in polynomial time, we may find a polynomial time algorithm
finding a valid assignment for any 3-CNF, which finishes the proof of Theorem 4.4. 2
4.2. Main Proof
Now we are going to prove Theorem 4.2: it is hard to find any motivating subgraph,
not just minimal ones.
PROOF. Assume by contradiction we have a poly-time algorithm A which can solve
MS. Notice that we can use A to check whether a graph has a motivating subgraph.
Now we propose the following algorithm that solves MMS by calling A.
For a given graph G, check whether G contains a motivating subgraph. If not, we
reject the input. Repeatedly remove an edge from G such that the remaining graph
still includes a motivating subgraph, until no edge can be removed.
The correctness of the algorithm is straightforward, while the running time of the
algorithm is polynomial of the size of the graph. From Theorem 4.4 we know that MS
is NP-hard.
5. HARDNESS OF MOTIVATING AGENTS BY PLACING INTERMEDIATE REWARD
In this section, we consider the question of whether we can place intermediate reward
on internal nodes to motivate the agent. Denote by r(v) the reward for node v; the
agent at node u will continue to move if and only if there exists a path P from u to t
such that
c′(P ) = c(u, v0) + β
∑
v∈P,v 6=u,t
(c(v, v′)− r(v)) ≤ 0,
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where v0 denotes the first node after u in P , and v′ denotes the node after v on P .
Let c(t, t′) = 0. The agent chooses the path that minimize c′(P ). We are interested in
finding the configuration that places the smallest total sum of reward that motivate
the agent to reach t (which is the third open problem in [?]).
5.1. Problem statement
As suggested by [?], multiple versions of this problem are considered. In the first two
versions, we restrict attention to positive rewards. In the first version, we might put
rewards that are never claimed. We avoid this in the second version: all rewards that
we put must be claimed. In the third version, we consider the possibility of placing
negative rewards, which can be used to prevent the agent from entering bad paths. In
this version, we want to minimize the sum of absolute values of all rewards.
We formally define this problem:
Definition 5.1. Minimum Total Rewards with bias factor β (MTRβ) Given a
weighted acyclic graph G, node s, t, and a real number R, decide whether there ex-
ists a reward configuration r(v),∀v ∈ G such that the agent is motivated to reach the
goal, and that
∑
v∈G |r(v)| ≤ R.
There are three versions of the problem, depending on the constraints on the
rewards:
MTRβ I: r(v) ≥ 0,∀v.
MTRβ II: r(v) ≥ 0,∀v ∈ P ; r(v) = 0,∀v 6∈ P , where P is the path that is actually taken
by the agent.
MTRβ III: r(v) ∈ R.
5.2. Main Theorem
We show that all versions of this problem are NP-hard:
THEOREM 5.2. MTRβ I,II,III are NP-hard for all β < 1.
We prove the theorem by reducing 3-SAT to MTRβ . The reduction graph is depicted
in Figure 6 (detailed description will follow). The proof idea is as below: We construct
a long graph body with two long strings (unvnun−1vn−1 · · ·u0 and u′nv′nu′n−1v′n−1 · · ·u′0),
and set weight in the graph such that there is reward on one and only one of vi and
v′i in the minimum reward setting; also, the one with reward depends on the 3-SAT
clause so as to construct a valid assignment.
5.3. Graph construction
For any 3-SAT instance, suppose it has m clauses and n variables.
Let x = β−1 − 1, y = 12x, and
gk = 6(2n− k),
hk = 6(2n− k) + 6 + y,
rt = 12n− 6 + 6β−1,
l =
⌈
nx+ 12n+ 6β−1 − 6
βx
⌉
+ 1.
We choose n large enough such that
nx = n(β−1 − 1) > 2β−1.
We construct graph G in the following way: We construct l + 1 nodes for each clause
i, namely ai,1, ai,2, · · · , ai,l, bi; and 4 nodes ui, u′i, vi, v′i for each variable i. We also have
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node c∗, s (source) and t (terminal). We construct edges using the following configura-
tion: (A triple below denotes the (start node, end node, weight) of an edge )
(1) (s, a1,1, 0); (ai,1, bi, 0); (ai,j , ai,j+1, βx); (ai,l, ai+1,1, 0); (1 ≤ i ≤ m− 1, 1 ≤ j ≤ l − 1)
(2) (am,l, c1, 0), (ci, ci+1, 6), (cn, un, 6), (cn, u′n, 6); (1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1)
(3) (ui, vi, x); (u′i, v′i, x); (1 ≤ i ≤ n)
(4) (vi, ui−1, 6); (vi, u′i−1, 6); (v′i, ui−1, 6); (v′i, u′i−1, 6); (1 ≤ i ≤ n)
(5) (u0, t, 0); (u′0, t, 0).
For a clause i that contains variable k, we construct (bi, uk−1, hk), (bi, u′k−1, hk), If it
contains a positive subclause of k, we construct (ai,j , vk, gk), 2 ≤ j ≤ l; otherwise if it
contains ”not variable k”, we construct (ai,j , v′k, gk), 2 ≤ j ≤ l. An illustration of the
graph is depicted in Figure 6. For simplicity, direct values of hk and gk are drawn.
The graph shows an example of a clause with vn and ¬vk. The feasibility of this graph
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is easily seen from the fact that β < 1 (so x > 0). We now prove the following main
proposition:
PROPOSITION 5.3. The 3-CNF is satisfiable if and only if G has a minimum feasible
configuration with sum of rewards at most nx+ rt.
5.4. Two Lemmas
To start with the proof, we first give two lemmas. The first lemma is about constraints
in our graph:
LEMMA 5.4. We have
hkβ
−1 + 6(k − 1) > nx+ rt, (7)
gkβ
−1 + 6k > nx+ rt, (8)
(l − 1)βx > rt + nx, (9)
hk < x+ gk + 6, (10)
x+ gk − x+ 6k < rt, (11)
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x+ gk − x+ 6k < hk + 6(k − 1), (12)
βx+ gk − x+ 6k < rt, (13)
6β−1 + 6(n− 1) + 6n = rt, (14)
x+ gk − x+ 6k < gkβ−1 − x+ 6k. (15)
Each of the inequalities (equality) are necessary in guiding the agent to t. For example,
(7) makes sure that the edge of (bi, uk−1) will not be used by the agent if the sum of
rewards is at most nx+ rt. Details will be explained later in the main proof.
PROOF. We have hkβ−1+6(k−1) = β−1(6(2n−k)+6+y)+6(k−1) > β−16(2n−k)+6k =
gkβ
−1 + 6k. On the other hand,
gkβ
−1 + 6k = β−16(2n− k) + 6k
≥ 6n+ 6nβ−1
= 12n+ 6nx
> nx+ 12n+ 6β−1 − 6 = nx+ rt.
The last inequality is because the way we choose n: nx > 2β−1. So we prove (7) and (8).
To prove (9), we choose an l large enough: thus we have
rt + nx = 12n− 6 + 6β−1 + nx ≤ βx(l − 1).
(10) follows directly from definition.
For (11) the left hand side is gk + 6k = 6(2n− k) + 6k = 12n < rt.
For (12) the right hand side is hk + 6(k − 1) = 12n + y > 12n which is the left hand
side.
(13) is a direct induction of (11), and (14) is the definition of rt.
For (15), it is sufficient to prove x < gk(β−1 − 1). In fact we have gk(β−1 − 1) = gkx =
6(2n− k)x > x.
So we prove all the inequalities and equalities.
The second lemma is a simple equivalent condition for the agent to make next move;
we use this condition to simplify our proof.
LEMMA 5.5. The agent continues to move if and only if there exists a path P such
that
β−1c(P ) = β−1c(e1) +
∑
e∈P :e 6=e1
c(e) ≤
∑
v∈P
r(v),
where e1 is the first edge of P .
PROOF. This lemma can be obtained simply by multiplying β−1 in the definition
formula at the beginning of this section.
By Lemma 5.5, the agent evaluates
β−1c(e1) +
∑
e∈P :e 6=e1
c(e)
instead of c(P ) for every path P at each node, and choose the edge which minimizes
this value.
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5.5. Main proof of theorem 5.2
PROOF. We first prove the achievability of the bound nx + rt when the clause is
satisfiable.
PROPOSITION 5.6. If the 3-CNF is satisfiable, then G has a minimum feasible con-
figuration with sum of rewards at most nx+ rt.
PROOF. If the 3-CNF is satisfiable, we construct a reward configuration as follows:
Pick one valid assignment and let r(vi) = x if variable i is true in the assignment,
otherwise let r(v′i) = x. Also let r(t) = rt. There’s no reward on all the other nodes. We
now prove that this is a valid setting: Define the length value of a path P from v to v′,
denoted l(P ), to be the sum of all weights on the path minus sum of all rewards on the
path except v and v′:
l(P ) =
∑
e∈P
c(e)−
∑
u∈P :u 6=v,v′
r(u).
The distance of a node v to t, denoted d(v), is defined as the minimum length value of
all paths getting from v to t. In fact, it’s easy to see that in this setting all vi, v′i have
d(vi) = d(v
′
i) = 6 + (k − 1)(6 + x − x) = 6k, and if variable i is true then d(ui) = 6k,
otherwise d(u′i) = 6k. By easy computation using lemma 5.4, one can verify that the
agent makes all the way to t under the construction, thus finishing the proof; the
details of this verification is provided in the appendix.
We then prove that the satisfiability of the clause when nx+ rt is achieved.
PROPOSITION 5.7. If G has a minimum feasible configuration with sum of rewards
at most nx+ rt, then the 3-CNF is satisfiable,
PROOF. First notice that in the minimum reward configuration the agent cannot
traverse through any bi to uk, since otherwise it requires at least β−1hk + 6(k − 1) >
rt + nx (by (7)) reward.
On the other hand, in a minimum setting the edge (ai,j , vk) also cannot be used, since
otherwise it requires at least β−1gk + 6k > rt + nx (by (8)) reward.
Combine the two facts above, we know that the agent will reach c1. Notice that
all path from c1 to t has the form c1c2 · · · cnu∗nv∗nu∗n−1 · · · v∗1t, where u∗i ∈ {ui, u′i}, v∗i ∈{vi, v′i}. On c1, the agent evaluates the cost of any of these paths (excluding the re-
wards) to be 6β−1 + 6(n − 1) + 6n = rt + nx (by (14)), so at least rt + nx rewards has
to be put on nodes {c1, c2, ..., cn, un, · · · , u1, u′n, · · · , u′1, vn, · · · , v1, v′n, · · · , v′1, t}, in all three
versions of MTRβ . And so if G has a minimum feasible configuration with sum of re-
wards at most nx+rt, no reward is put on nodes ai,j or bi. Also in MTRβ III, no negative
rewards can be given. consider the path that the agent chooses the shortest on c1, we
know that there must be a path from c1 to t with a total reward (including reward on
t) of rt+nx. Then since there’s no path from vk to v′k, uk to u
′
k (vice versa), we can’t put
rewards on both vk and v′k or uk and u
′
k (the agent can’t get both of them).
Consider the following assignment: if there’s reward on node vk, let variable vk =
true; otherwise let variable vk = false. In the following, we prove this assignment gives
a valid assignment of the original 3-SAT clause.
Note that if there’s reward on vk, then v′k doesn’t have; vice versa. So to prove this
proposition we only need to prove that for every clause i, among the three v kind
nodes (call them v∗k1 , v
∗
k2
, v∗k3 , v
∗
ki
∈ {vki , v′ki}) that ai,2 connects to, there’s at least one
with reward. To prove this, first notice that the shortest path from ai,2 to t must be
through some v∗kj : The path through ai,j(j > 2) and then to v
∗
kj
has same costs but
an additional βx cost; and the path from ai+1,1 has cost at least βx(l − 1) > nx + rt
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(by (9) and that there’s no reward on ai,j), which is larger than the total sum of rewards.
If there’s no reward on v∗k1 , v
∗
k2
or v∗k3 , we have
d(ai,2) = min
1≤j≤3,v∗
kj
gkj + d(v
∗
kj ) = min1≤j≤3
min{gkj + 6 + d(ukj−1), gkj + 6 + d(u′kj−1)} := S.
So at ai,1 the edge to ai,2 is evaluated as βx · β−1 + S = x + S, since there’s no reward
on ai,1. On the other hand, the path to bi is evaluated as (note that there’s no reward
on bi)
0 + d(bi) = min
1≤j≤3
min{hkj + d(ukj−1), hkj + d(u′kj−1)}
< min
1≤j≤3
min{gkj + x+ 6 + d(ukj−1), gkj + x+ 6 + d(u′kj−1)}(by(10))
= x+ S.
So the agent will go to bi, which makes contradiction with above. So there’s reward on
at least one of vk1 , vk2 , vk3 . Since it’s impossible that we put reward on both vk and v′k,
we prove the proposition.
Combine the two sides above, we prove Theorem 5.2.
6. CONCLUSION AND FURTHER WORK
In this paper, we solve three open problems raised by [?]. Our results show the close
relationship between the special structure Fk and exponential cost ratio, and thus
we should avoid such structure when designing structure of tasks. We also prove the
hardness of motivating agents - either by deleting edges, or putting rewards. These
problems seems to be intractable and we need a careful search when trying to motivate
agents.
As an extension of our work, we can consider other forms of the problem, for example,
for MTRβ , consider the following extension:
MTRβ IV: The designer can put any reward on any node, but only pays what the agent
actually claims. As a result, we only want to minimize the claimed total rewards.
Problem MTRβ IV seems to be NP-complete, but we are not able to show it using our
method.
We are also interested in the case where multi-agents collaboratively reach the tar-
get node. Similar question asked in this paper can be asked in this extension as well.
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A. PROOF TO LEMMAS IN SECTION 3
In the following proofs, we only require the property of ti that ti ≥ i + 1, which has
been derived in the main proof. Also note that Si = {j|1 ≤ j < i, tj ≥ i}.
A.1. Proof of Lemma 3.2
In addition, we prove
xm−1 +
∑
j∈Sm−1
xj =
∑
j:tj=m−1
xj +
∑
j:m−1<tj<m
xj +
∑
j∈Sm
xj ,
which will be used later.
PROOF. For m = 2, 3, . . . , n, note that tm−1 ≥ m, we have m − 1 ∈ Sm and m − 1 /∈
Sm−1. Therefore,
Sm−1 ∪ {m− 1} = {m− 1} ∪ {j|1 ≤ j < m− 1, tj ≥ m− 1}
= {m− 1} ∪ {j|1 ≤ j < m− 1, tj ≥ m}∪ {j|m− 1 ≤ tj < m}
= Sm ∪ {j|tj = m− 1}∪ {j|m− 1 < tj < m},
where sets on each side of the equality are disjoint. Thus,
xm−1 +
∑
j∈Sm−1
xj =
∑
j:tj=m−1
xj +
∑
j:m−1<tj<m
xj +
∑
j∈Sm
xj .
Also note that∑
j:tj=m−1
xj +
∑
j:m−1<tj<m
xj =
∑
j:m−1≤tj<m
xj =
∑
j∈Sm−1:m−1≤tj<m
xj ,
we have∑
j∈Sm
xj = xm−1 +
∑
j∈Sm−1
xj −
∑
j∈Sm−1:m−1≤tj<m
xj = xm−1 +
∑
j∈Sm−1:tj≥m
xj .
A.2. Proof of Lemma 3.3
PROOF. For convenience, we restate (5) here again:
a1 = 1, ai = βbi−1 +
∑
j:i−1<tj<i
(1− β)bj , bi = ai +
∑
j:tj=i
(1− β)bj .
Note bi ≥ ai can be directly derived from the recursion formula, we only need to prove
ai ≥ β|Si|. Now we suppose that i is fixed.
We prove firstly that for m = 1, 2, . . . , n,
am +
∑
j∈Sm
(1− β)bj = 1.
This can be proved by induction on m: the base case of m = 1 holds trivially.
For inductive case: if it holds for m− 1,
am +
∑
j∈Sm
(1− β)bj
= bm−1 − (1− β)bm−1 +
∑
j:m−1<tj<m
(1− β)bj +
∑
j∈Sm
(1− β)bj
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= am−1 +
∑
j:tj=m−1
(1− β)bj − (1− β)bm−1 +
∑
j:m−1<tj<m
(1− β)bj +
∑
j∈Sm
(1− β)bj
= am−1 +
∑
j∈Sm−1
(1− β)bj (16)
= 1,
where equality (16) follows from Lemma 3.2.
Let Si =
{
j1, j2, . . . , j|Si|
}
where j1 < j2 < · · · < j|Si|. Then for l = 1, 2, . . . , |Si| we
have tjl ≥ i > jl, thus for all 1 ≤ p ≤ l ≤ |Si|, we have tjp ≥ i ≥ jl + 1 > jp, thus
jp ∈ Sjl+1. Now we can obtain for l = 1, 2, . . . , |Si|,
bjl +
l−1∑
p=1
(1− β)bjp = βbjl +
l∑
p=1
(1− β)bjp ≤ ajl+1 +
∑
j∈Sjl+1
(1− β)bj = 1.
Note ai+
∑|Si|
p=1(1−β)bjp = 1, to prove ai ≥ β|Si|, we only need to prove
∑|Si|
p=1(1−β)bjp ≤
1− β|Si|, or more strongly ∑lp=1(1− β)bjp ≤ 1− βl for l = 1, 2, . . . , |Si|.
We prove this by induction on l: again, the base case of l = 1 holds trivially.
For inductive case: if it holds for l − 1,
l∑
p=1
(1− β)bjp =
l−1∑
p=1
(1− β)bjp + (1− β)bjl
≤
l−1∑
p=1
(1− β)bjp + (1− β)
(
1−
l−1∑
p=1
(1− β)bjp
)
= β
l−1∑
p=1
(1− β)bjp + 1− β
≤ β (1− βl−1)+ 1− β
= 1− βl.
A.3. Proof of Lemma 3.4
PROOF.
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Fig. 7. the graph contains an Fk-minor.
Let U1, U2, . . . , Uk,W be subgraphs of σ(G) such that there is an edge between two
nodes in one subgraph if and only if this edge exists in σ(G). The nodes of these sub-
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graphs are defined as follows: for i = 1, 2, . . . , k − 1, nodes of Ui are nodes between ui
and ui+1 in P (including ui and excluding ui+1); Uk contains only uk; and nodes of W
are the union of k parts V1, V2, . . . , Vk−1,W ′ where Vi are nodes between ui and u′i in Pi
(including u′i and excluding ui) for i = 1, 2, . . . , k − 1 and W ′ are all nodes after uk in P
(excluding uk). See Figure 7.
Clearly, U1, U2, . . . , Uk,W are disjoint while each subgraph is connected. For i =
1, 2, . . . , k − 1, Ui and Ui+1 are connected by the edge immediately before ui+1 in P ,
and Ui and W are connected by the edge immediately after ui in Pi. Uk and W are
connected by the edge immediately after uk in P . Thus {U1, U2, . . . , Uk,W} can be con-
sidered as an Fk-minor, which finishes the proof.
B. VERIFICATION IN PROPOSITION ??
We say a node p will lead to another node q, if at node p the agent will choose the path
from p to q. We thus notice the following statements:
(1) node swill lead to a1,1 because (13) (d(a1,1) ≤ βx+gk−x+d(vk) = x+gk−x+6k ≤ rt).
(2) ai,1 will lead to ai,2: The path that goes through ai,2 and then vk (not losing gener-
ality, suppose vk is true) has length value x+ gk − x+ d(vk) = x+ gk − x+ 6k, and
the path that goes through bi has length value hk+6(k− 1). So we derive this from
(11) and (12).
(3) ai,j , j < l will lead to ai,j+1, because (11) and (15) (The path that uses ai,j to vk has
length value gkβ−1 + 6k).
(4) ai,l, i < m will lead to ai+1,1, because the path from ai+1,1 → ai+1,2 → vk → t has
length value βx+ gk − x+ 6k. So we derive this from (13) and (15).
(5) am,l will lead to c1, because (14).
(6) ci will lead to ci+1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1, because (14).
(7) cn will lead to u∗n (here u∗n = un if variable n is true, otherwise u∗n = u′n) because
(14).
(8) The agent then travels from u∗n to t , which is trivial by computation on the weights.
